NOTES AND COMMENTS
CURING DEFECTS OF NATURAL JUSTICE BY APPEAL

The recent appearance in the law reports of two British Commonwealth decisions (Calvin v Carr [1979] 2 All ER 440 (PC) and Pollock v
Alberta Union of Provincial Employees (1979) 90 DLR (3d) 506
(Alberta SC)) provides an opportunity to consider some of the
interesting problems raised by the question whether a defect of natural
justice at a first hearing may be cured by a domestic or appeal body at
a later stage. It is necessary to canvass the status of the first decision as
well as the pragmatic and logical difficulties presented by a possible
appeal against such a decision. However, each of these issues constitutes
a complex problem in its own right. This note merely seeks to draw
attention to them and to put forward some tentative suggestions and
criticisms. A consideration of the Commonwealth cases is useful, since
it is from similar cases that our Appellate Division has drawn assistance
when considering these issues.
The Effect of an Appeal
The general principle. Where an administrative organ or domestic
tribunal is required to observe the principles of natural justice and fails
to do so, its act is invalid and this invalidity cannot be cured by a
subsequent appeal or in any other manner short of a hearing de novo.
This was made quite clear by the Appellate Division in Turner v
Jockey Club of South Africa 1974 (3) SA 633 (A), where the respondents
had argued (inter alia) that even if they had not given a jockey a fair
hearing at an initial inquiry, they had subsequently afforded him ample
opportunity to put his side of the case during the appeals that he made
within the appeal mechanism of the Jockey Club rules. Botha JA
(delivering the unanimous judgment) found that the initial hearing had
not been in accordance with the 'fundamental principles ofjustice' and
that it should have been set aside by the appellate organs within the
Jockey Club. Failure by them to do so, even though they might have
remitted the matter for further hearing or, indeed, heard further
evidence themselves, could not cure the defect:
'Where the decision of an inquiry board is vitiated by a disregard of the fundamental principles of justice, the matter cannot be corrected by a remittal or by
further evidence, or in any other manner short of a hearing de novo; and the person
affected can always seek redress in the ordinary courts of law... (at 655D).
'... I conclude that the finding of the stipendiary stewards against the appellant
...was vitiated by a disregard of the requirements of natural justice, and that it
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was not cured or remedied in the hearing of the appeal before the Local Executive
Stewards or the Head Executive Stewards, and must accordingly be set aside'
(at 659D-E).

In reaching this conclusion, the court referred with approval to a
Privy Council decision, Annamunthodo v Oilfield Workers' Trade Union
[1961] AC 945 (PC), and the judgment of Megarry J in Leary v
National Union of Vehicle Builders [1971] Ch 34, both of which provide
direct support for the principle. A Canadian decision, King v University
of Saskatchewan [1969] SCR 678, (1969) 6 DLR (3d) 120, which had
been used by the respondent's counsel to support the contrary view,
had been distinguished by Megarry J in Leary, and Botha JA accepted
the distinction (at 659C-D of the Turner report). Annamunthodo and
Leary were cited extensively by Botha JA. It is of interest and relevance
to South African law to note that the same issue has recently been
afforded considerable attention by the Privy Council in Calvin v Carr
[1979] 2 All ER 440 (PC) and the Alberta Supreme Court in Pollock v
Alberta Union of Provincial Employees (1979) 90 DLR (3d) 506
(Alberta SC).
A qualification to the general principle. In Pollock delegates to a union
convention had voted to increase the monthly dues charged to members.
Mrs Pollock, who was a member of the union (but not a delegate to
the convention), had circulated a petition for signature by members
seeking to have the increase suspended until the question could be
voted upon at a general referendum. She also wrote letters to certain
newspapers complaining about the increase in rather strong terms. For
this she was suspended conditionally by the union discipline committee
upon the basis of various disciplinary charges. She appealed to the
provincial executive of the union and later to the full union convention,
but the suspension conditions were modified only slightly. She then
renewed her appeals on the basis that in neither of the previous appeals
had she been given a fair hearing, and the Provincial Executive agreed
to hear her again. The appeal was partially successful this time, but she
was still suspended for one year. She then sought relief in the courts.
After reviewing the authorities which make it clear that domestic
tribunals must observe the principles of natural justice where this is not
expressly excluded by contract (at 512-13; cf Turner 1974 (3) SA
633 (A) at 644-6), Laycraft J found that the first two appeals were not
in accordance with 'general standards of fair play' (at 513). In determining whether this failure could have been cured by the second
hearing before the provincial executive, he considered both King and
Leary (supra), distinguishing the former (in which the Supreme Court
of Canada had held that a fair hearing on appeal had cured earlier
defects) on the ground that the appeal body in that case was not really
an appeal body at all, but had 'original jurisdiction as the triers of fact'
((1979) 90 DLR (3d) at 515-16). This was the ground upon which King
had been distinguished by Megarry J in Leary, and Laycraft J pointed
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out that this distinction has been adopted in British Columbia and
Nova Scotia (at 516). Thus it is important to ascertain whether the

'appeal body' is really an appeal body at all. For it may well be that
such a body is capable of affording the aggrieved person a 'hearing
de novo'. This point would appear to have been accepted by the court
in Turner, where BothajA found MegarryJ's reasoning in distinguishing King to be 'adequate' and 'convincing'.
Of course, if the appeal body does not have 'original jurisdiction',
then, as Megarry J said, 'a failure of natural justice in the trial body
cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body'
([1971] Ch 34 at 49F).

Is there a generalprinciple at all? What has become clear, therefore, is
that not all 'appeals' may be viewed simply as such by the court; and
where the court concludes that the appeal itself constituted a rehearing,
it may find that any defects which may have occurred at the first
hearing could be cured by the 'appeal'. This, indeed, was the position
taken by the Privy Council in Calvin's case.
Calvin was the owner of a New Zealand-bred racehorse which had
been entered for a race in New South Wales, Australia. Although the
horse was well bred, had shown good form in New Zealand, and was
popular in the betting, it ran a poor fourth. An inquiry was instituted
by the stewards, who came to the prima facie opinion that the horse
had not run a straight course and that the jockey had not run the horse
in the proper manner. On this basis, they brought charges under the
Rules of Racing of the Australian Jockey Club, which required that
every horse should be run on its merits and that ajockey should take all
reasonable measures to ensure that the horse gives of its best. They
found that the jockey was guilty of an offence and that the appellant
was a party to the breach. Thejockey was suspended for a year and the
appellant was barred from running horses for a year, and was also
deprve-d of his mcmibers1ip Of de Australian jockey Club.
The parties appealed to the committee of the Australian Jockey
Club. After a full hearing the conunittee dismissed the appeals of
Calvin and the jockey (although they allowed the appeal of a foreman,
who had also been disqualified in connection with the offence).
Calvin then commenced action in the New South Wales Supreme
Court against the chairman, committee and stipendiary stewards for
declarations that his purported disqualification by the stewards and the
purported dismissal of his appeal were void, and for an injunction
restraining the respondents from acting on the basis that the purported
disqualification was valid.
Calvin raised a number of grounds to support his action, but these
were unsuccessful. However, although the trial judge found against
Calvin, he accepted that in certain respects the stewards had failed to
observe the principles ofnaturaljustice. But he held that the proceedings
before the committee constituted a hearing de novo and that the defects
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in the stewards' inquiry were thereby cured.
In the appeal to the Privy Council, the parties were not requested to
argue whether the finding that the first hearing was defective was
correct. The Board requested argument on the second aspect first, that
is, whether any defect in natural justice could be cured by the appeal
before the committee, and found that it was able to come to a decision
by dealing with this question alone. It proceeded on the assumption
that the first finding was correct, although Lord Wilberforce, delivering
the opinion of the Board, did point out that 'a substantial argument
could be put forward that there was no failure of natural justice at all'
([1979] 2 All ER 440 at 444).

Dealing with the second point, Lord Wilberforce stated:
'... their Lordships recognise and indeed assert that no clear and absolute rule can
be laid down on the question whether defects in natural justice appearing at an
original hearing, whether administrative or quasi-judicial, can be "cured" through
appeal proceedings. The situations in which this issue arises are too diverse, and
the rules by which they are governed so various, that this must be so' (at 447h).

Lord Wilberforce mentioned that counsel had suggested that the
decisions on this matter were in conflict, and that special emphasis in
this regard had been laid upon an apparent conflict between Annamunthodo v Oifields Workers' Trade Union (supra)(one of the cases approved
by Botha JA in Turner) and Pillai v Singapore City Council [1968]
1 WLR 1278 (PC), both Privy Council cases. However, Lord
Wilberforce thought that many of the inconsistencies would disappear
or at least diminish on analysis, and that although it was not possible to
lay down any general principle which would apply to all situations, it
was possible to discern 'a number of typical situations as to which some
general principle can be stated' (at 448).
(a) On the one hand, 'there are cases where the rules provide for a
rehearing by the original body, or some fuller or enlarged form
of it'. Examples of such a situation are likely to be found in relation
to social clubs, for example where 'the first hearing is superseded
by the second, or, putting it in contractual terms, the parties are
taken to have agreed to accept the decision of the hearing body,
whether original or adjourned'.
(b) On the other hand, or 'at the other extreme', said Lord Wilberforce, there 'are cases where, after examination of the whole
hearing structure, in the context of the particular activity to which
it relates (trade union membership, planning, employment etc)
the conclusion is reached that a complainant has the right to
nothing less than a fair hearing both at the original and at the
appeal stage'.
It was in this context only that the Board accepted Megarry J's
statement in Leary:
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'If the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a fair trial and
the right of appeal, why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with an
unjust trial and a fair appeal?... As a general rule ... I hold that a failure of natural
justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an
appellate body' ([1971] Ch 34 at 49).

For if this statement really purported to be a general principle, it was,
in their lordships' opinion, too broadly stated:
'It affirms a principle which may be found correct in a category of cases; these may
very well include trade union cases, where movement solidarity and dislike of a
rebel, or renegade, may make it difficult for appeals to be conducted in an atmosphere of detached impartiality and so make a fair trial at the first (probably branch)
level an essential condition ofjustice. But to seek to apply it generally overlooks,
in their Lordships' respectful opinion, both the existence of the first category, and
the possibility that, intermediately, the conclusion to be reached, on the rules and

on the contractual context, is that those who have joined in an organisation, or
contract, should be taken to have agreed to accept what in the end is a fair decision,
notwithstanding some initial defect' (at 448e-f of the report of Calvin's case).

Lord Wilberforce emphasized that such intermediate cases do exist
and that the court should always consider all the circumstances
surrounding the 'appeal'.
Having made the distinction, his lordship went on to analyse a
number of Australian, Canadian and New Zealand cases, showing that,
in terms of the above distinction, most of these apparently conflicting
cases could be reconciled. (See the report at 449-50.) So, for example,
Annamunthodo ([1961] AC 945 (PC)), which was a trade union case in
which it had been decided that an appeal could not cure a defect of
natural justice at the first hearing, was not in conflict with Pillai
([1968] 1 WLR 1278 (PC)) after all; the latter case, which concerned
the dismissal of an employee by an administrative body, was one where,
even if natural justice should have been observed, a failure to do so had
been cured by 'a rehearing by way of evidence de novo'.
In the light of this analysis; the Board found that the defects, if any,
of the first inquiry by the stewards had been cured by the appeal to the
committee. When the proceedings were looked at as a whole, the
appellant's case had 'received, overall, full and fair consideration'
(at 452 of the Calvin report).
Evaluation
Is the reasoning of the Board really acceptable? On the face of it, the
articulation of a range of categories, from the case where the appeal falls
within a fairly rigid appeal structure to the case where the appeal
(when viewed against the context of all the circumstances) is really a
complete rehearing de novo, would appear to be a logical development
of the dicta in cases such as Turner and Pollock. But the Board's
reasoning is open to objection on at least two grounds:
(a) In the first place, by criticizing MegarryJ's statement of a general
rule, their lordships were really begging the question. Megarry J had
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said: 'If the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to

a fair trial and the right of appeal . . .' (my emphasis). When one finds
that the 'appeal' was really a hearing de novo, and one concludes thatafter a consideration of the rules (and the contract, if necessary)-the

complainant must be 'taken to have agreed to accept the decision of the
hearing body, whether original or adjourned' (see Lord Wilberforce at
448a of the Calvin report), there is obviously no right of appeal in
existence at all.

(b) But if, after considering 'the rules and the law', one concludes
that the complainant has a r ght to a trial and an appeal, 'why should he
be told that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a "fair
appeal"?' (Megarry J at 49E of the Leary report). For, as Megarry J
went on to say: 'Even if the appeal is treated as a hearing de novo, the

[complainant] isbeing stripped of his right to appeal to anotherbody from
the effective decision to expel him' (ibid; my emphasis). This difficulty

was ignored by the Board, perhaps as a result of its failure to appreciate
the tautology outlined in (a)above. Yet it issurely a fundamental point,
and to ignore it introduces the danger that a right of appeal will
disappear by sleight of hand.
Further Problems
Other questions of great relevance to our law are raised by these
Commonwealth decisions. Some will be discussed briefly here,
although each merits considerable attention in its own right.
The duty to exhaust domestic or administrative remedies. Is a party who
claims that he has been denied natural justice at the first hearing
required to exhaust his domestic remedies before approaching the court
for relief?
Commentators have pointed out that the courts have not been clear
on this point. (See, for example, Marinus Wiechers Administratiefreg
(1973) 280ff; L A Rose InnesJudicialReview ofAdministrative Tribunals
in South Africa (1963) 76ff. Cf P Jackson Natural Justice (1973) 71ff.)
Turner is, however, cited in South Africa as authority for the principle
that a party need not exhaust his domestic remedies unless obliged to,
expressly or impliedly, by contract. (See Moodley v Shri Siva Subramanier
Aulayam 1979 (2) SA 696 (SE) at 698-700.) This was also the view taken
by the Privy Council in White v Kuzych [1951] AC 585 (at 594-5), a
case which was noted and distinguished by Laycraft J in Pollock (1979)
90 DLR (3d) (at 514-15). In South Africa there seems no dearth of
authority for this view. (See the cases reviewed by Wiechers loc cit and
Rose Innes loc cit. See also Marinus Wiechers 'Administrative Law' in
The Law of South Africa ed W AJoubert 1(1976) para 89 p 60.) Furthermore, it is recognized that this proposition can be extended to administrative remedies as well, if this is clear from the relevant statutory
provisions. (See, for example, Rose Innes op cit 76-8.) Indeed, the
ambit of statute and contract is so wide that the principle is stated the
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other way round by both Rose Innes and Wiechers: that the general
principle is that a complainant has a duty to exhaust his domestic or
administrative remedies except in certain circumstances. (For the
exceptions, see Rose Innes op cit 81ff; Wiechers in LAWSA I para 89
pp 60-1.)
Now the question I am concerned with here is whether a complainant
should be obliged to exercise his right to appeal to a domestic or
administrative appeal organ where the original hearing organ has failed
to observe the principles of natural justice. Obviously, where this is
required by the terms of a contract, the complainant has waived his
rght to approach the court. And where it is required by statute, the
statute has ousted the jurisdiction of the court until such time as the
administrative remedies have been exhausted. Apart from these
situations, however, several policy reasons have been suggested as to
why the general principle should apply in other situations: these
remedies are often cheaper, perhaps quicker, than an application to
court; and the appellate body may well reverse the decision, thereby
removing the cause for complaint. (Jockey Club of South Africa v
Feldman 1942 AD 340, 362. Cf Rose Innes op cit 76; Wiechers in
LAWSA I para 89 p 60.) But it is also a time-wasting and futile pursuit
if the appellate organ dismisses the appeal. To reiterate the point made
by Megarry J in Leary's case:
'If the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a fair trial and

the right of appeal, why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with an
unjust trial and a fair appeal?... Even if the appeal is treated as a hearing de novo,
the member is being stripped of his right to appeal to another body from the
effective decision to expel him' ([1971] Ch 34 at 49).

But not only is the complainant being stripped of his right to more
than one fair hearing, there is also an important policy argument
against allowing any appeal from a hearing at which the principles of
natural justice were not observed: that the appeal is by its very nature
inevitably affected by what took place at the first hearing, unless it is a
complete rehearing (in which case it is not an appeal in the present
sense). To adopt a phrase used by Botha JA in Turner (at 658D of the
report), the taint of the hearing is carriedforward to the appeal. Where
natural justice has been denied, the record of the first hearing will be
fundamentally defective either because one party was not allowed to
present his case and evidence adequately, or because the decision-maker
was biased and his or its interpretation of the evidence will be coloured
by this bias. The normal appeal is usually heavily influenced by the
record of the original decision-making body. (For an analysis of the
distinction between appeals in the wide sense and appeals in the
ordinary sense, see A Rabie 'Administratiefregtelike Appelle' (1979)
12 DeJure 128.)
It is worth noting that the general principle is quite the reverse in
England: there a complainant has no duty to exhaust domestic or
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administrative remedies before approaching the court for review,

except in certain special circumstances. (See H W R Wade Administrative Law 4 ed (1977) 561ff; S A de Smith Judicial Review of Adminis-

trative Action 3 ed (1973) 374-6.)
The void/voidable distinction. Intertwined with this question is the
void/voidable issue. Is a decision reached in breach of natural justice
void, or is it merely voidable; or is this even a meaningful distinction?
If it is void ab initio would there be any decision from which to appeal?
This point is recognized by Wiechers, who balks at the logical
consequences of allowing immediate review of all ultra vires decisions.
(See Administratiefreg 282.)
In South Africa it is said that decisions which are in substance ultra
vires are void ab initio, but that decisions made in breach of natural
justice are merely voidable. (See Rose Innes op cit 93-4, 157; Wiechers
op cit 237 and in LAWSA I para 82 p 51.)
Rose Innes justifies the distinction on two grounds: (a) because
natural justice is a requirement of the common law, whereas substantive
vires are usually determined by statute (op cit 93); and (b)an affected
party may waive or forfeit his right to object to a decision reached in
breach of natural justice, in which case the decision stands; whereas an
'ultra vires proceeding or decision which is void ab initio ... cannot be
cured by waiver, acquiescence or default' (op cit 157).
Wiechers relies rather on case authority and cites two cases: Winter v
Administrator-in-ExecutiveCommittee 1973 (1) SA 873 (A) at 891A-C and
Adjunk-Minister van Landbou v Heatherdale Farms (Pty) Ltd 1970 (4) SA
184 (T) at 195E. It is clear that the HeatherdaleFarms case does support
W-echers:
'Dit is waar dat die respondente nie enige regte as gevolg van die appellant se
beslissing verkry het nie, maar dit is nie omdat die beslissing ipso iure nietig was
nie. Die nie-nakoming van die audi alterampartem-re6l het wel die beslissing aanvegbaar gemaak, maar dit was nie sonder meer nietig nie' (per Trengrove J at 195E-F
of the report).

However, the Winter case is not in point: in this case Ogilvie
Thompson CJ (for the unanimous court) specifically held that the rule
audi alteram partem did not apply to the facts of the case-be did not
hold that the rule did apply but that in this case the failure to observe
it did not invalidate the decision:
"... the exercise of those powers is, by reason of the various features I have mentioned, not subject to the maxim audi alteram partem and .... consequently, the
issue of the deportation orders was not invalidated by the circumstance that no
prior opportunity was accorded to the appellants to make representations against
such issue' (1973 (1) SA 873 at 891C-D).

And in any event, the Chief Justice was concerned with an ouster
clause removing the court's jurisdiction (s 1(3) of Proclamation 50 of
1920 (SWA) as amended) and the possibility of getting around this on
the grounds of 'manifest absence ofjurisdiction'.
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So far as other cases are concerned, the courts here do not seem to
have directed their attention to the question, although Jansen JA in
Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk in Suid-Afrika
1976 (2) SA 1 (A) has perhaps provided some (albeit ambiguous)
support for the contrary view:
'Dat die fundamentele beginsels van geregtigheid hier in gedrang gekom het en
dat derhalwe die beslissing van die Algemene Sindale Kommissie nietig verklaar

moet word, skyn duidelik te wees' (at 29D; my italics).

(CfJerold Taitz 'But 'Twas a Famous Victory' 1978 ActaJuridica 109
at 121.)
So it is worth considering the apparent underlying justifications (as
put forward by Rose Innes and outlined above) for the distinction
between the status of a substantively ultra vires decision and one
reached in breach of natural justice.
Common law and statutory vires. The mere fact that an official or body
is required to observe requirements which are stipulated by the
common law (and not excluded by statute), for example, the requirements of natural justice, does not render the requirements any the less
important or necessary to fulfil than the requirement of vires. It is
merely that these requirements originate from a different legal source.
Common law and statute law act symbiotically to determine the
extent of the vires of the official or body and hence the legality of his or
its acts. Thus it seems to me that this distinction is not a satisfactory
ground for describing decisions reached in breach of natural justice as
voidable, not void.
The right to naturaljustice may be waived orforfeited. The real reason for
the distinction between the status of acts made in breach of natural
justice and other ultra vires acts is, I believe, the fact that a right to
object to a violation of natural justice may be waived or forfeited. It
does seem to be inconsistent to state that an ultra vires act is a 'mere
nullity'- 'there has been no decision at all'-while accepting that where
it is only natural justice that has been ignored such a decision still stands
unless and until it is set aside on review or declared void by the court.
But even this 'justification' is unacceptable once it is appreciated that
any ultra vires act has legal effect until it is set aside.
Even where a party chooses to ignore the act, he will be obliged to
prove its invalidity when raising its invalidity as a defence. Just as an
affected party may waive his right to object to a decision reached in
breach of natural justice, so he may accept as valid an ultra vires decision
affecting him. The only difference is that in the latter case another party
(for instance, the state) may have locus standi to attack the act or decision.
This truth has been recognized in England, where the void/voidable
distinction has been the subject of considerable dispute. (See the
references in S H Bailey, C A Cross and J F Garner Cases and Materials
in Administrative Law (1977) 570, as well as Wade Administrative Law
296-301, 560-1 and Jackson NaturalJustice chap 6.) There, although it
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was said in some cases that an act done in breach of natural justice was
only voidable (for example, Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852)
3 HLC 759 (10 ER 301) and Durayappah v Fernando [1967] 2 AC
337 (PC)), since Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (HL) it has been clear
that the English courts accept such an act as void:
'Then there was considerable argument whether in the result the .. decision is
void or merely voidable. Time and again in the cases I have cited it has been stated
that a decision given without regard to the principles of natural justice is void, and
that was expressly decided in Wood v Woad (1874) LR 9 Exch 190. I see no reason to
doubt these authorities. The body with the power to decide cannot lawfully
proceed to make a decision until it has afforded to the person affected a proper
opportunity to state his case' (per Lord Reid in Ridge at 80).

Jackson (NaturalJustice 69-70) relies upon the fact that Lords Evershed
and Devlin (in Ridge at 86 and 141-2 respectively) regard the decision
as only voidable, for the view that the issue is not yet settled. And there
have been other academic adherents to the 'voidable' school in the case
of natural justice. (See A Rubinstein Jurisdictionand Illegality (1965) 221,
a most important study of the question, and D M Gordon 'Certiorari
and the Revival of Error in Fact' (1926) 42 LQR 521 at 523.) However,

despite occasional aberrations to the contrary (see the discussion by
H W R Wade (1977) 93 LQR 8 at 10-11 and N P Gravells 'Time Limit
Clauses and Judicial Review-The Relevance of Context' (1978)
41 Modern LR 383 at 392-3), since the brilliant analysis of the issue by
Wade in a two-part article ('Unlawful Administrative Actions: Void or
Voidable?' (1967) 83 LQR 499, (1968) 84 LQR 95, especially 101ff)
it has become accepted by the courts and even former dissenters (see,
for instance, Lord Denning in his book The Discipline of Law (1979)
77-8) that an act done in breach of natural justice is void, not voidable.
The major obstacle was that it seems awkward that a void act may have
legal consequences unless and until set aside. But, as Wade has pointed
out,
'... once the court condemns
destitute of all legal effect from
the other hand, has legal effect
of that period it remains a valid
297).

[an order] as being void, it is seen to have been
the outset. An order which is merely voidable, on
up to the time when it is quashed, and in respect
order even after being quashed' (AdministrativeLaw

Even if the act or order is void, it is a matter of factual necessity that a

court order must be obtained declaring this to be the case, failing which
it will have legal effect just as if it were valid. And this is equally true of
acts contrary to natural justice and other illegal acts. It is not necessary
that the act be absolutely void in the sense that it has no effect whatsoever. Thus a void act may even have legal effect ad infinitum where, for
instance, a remedy is denied (for example, where prescription prohibits
the claimant from approaching the court).
This reasoning has now been fully accepted by the Privy Council in
Calvin's case:
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'The first issue arising in this appeal is whether the committee had any jurisdiction
to enter on the appeal. The appellant's proposition is that it had not, for the reason
that the stewards' "decision" was, on the assumption stated, void. A condition
precedent, it was said, of an appeal was the existence of a real, even though voidable,
decision.
'This argument led necessarily into the difficult area of what is void and what is
voidable, as to which some confusion exists in the authorities. Their Lordships'
opinion would be, if it became necessary to fix on one or other of these expressions,
that a decision made contrary to natural justice is void, but that, until it is so
declared by a competent body or court, it may have some effect, or existence, in
law. This condition might be better expressed by saying that the decision is invalid
or vitiated. In the present context, where the question is whether an appeal lies,
the impugned decision cannot be considered as totally void, in the sense of being
legally non-existent. So to hold would be wholly unreal. The decision of the
stewards resulted in disqualification, an effect with immediate serious consequences for the appellant. This was a fact: the appellant's horses could not run in,
or be entered for any race; the appellant lost his membership of the Australian
Jockey Club and could be excluded from their premises. These consequences
remained in effect unless and until the stewards' decision was challenged and, if so,
had sufficient existence in law to justify an appeal' ([1979] 2 All ER 440 (PC) at
445-6).
Lord Wilberforce went on to give the example of a criminal trial
during which took place serious irregularities but the judgment of
which nevertheless had legal effect until set aside on appeal, even
though the trial was 'in truth no trial at all'.
What is the conclusion to be drawn from this way of looking at the
meaning of 'void' for the purposes of natural justice? In effect, it means
that although the decision or act is void (since the official or body had
no power to act without observing natural justice), it must be declared
to be so in order to strip the act of its ostensible legal respectability and
effect. Thus the act is not necessarily a mere nullity with no existence at
all: it may even acquire legal respectability through the operation of
prescription or the refusal of a court (in its discretion) to grant, say, a
mandatory intcrdc1t. ('Cf.L.
theiscU-1ISusiI of
U discretion in Cape Town
0 fhis
Municipality v Abdulla 1974 (4) SA 428 (C) at 437; and cf Wade
Administrative Law 566ff; De Smith Judicial Review 130ff.) Needless to
say, the same effect applies in the case of ouster clauses and the waiving
or forfeiture of rights by a complainant.
In addition, although the act or decision is void, it can be appealed
against, since it exists and has effect. Thus there is no anomaly in
appealing to a domestic appeal body where there has been a failure of
natural justice in connection with the original decision. However, the
complainant may equally seek a declaration that the original decision is
void.
What is the importance of the distinction between void and
voidable? Jackson suggests that such a distinction provides no useful

guide. (See Natural Justice 69; and cf Lord Evershed in Ridge [1964]
AC 40 (HL) at 86.) But this view ignores two important consequences
of considering the act or decision void and not voidable:
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(a)If it isvoid, then it ispossible for the complainant to approach the
court immediately without exhausting his domestic remedies, and to
obtain relief by means of a declaratory order only, without the need to
obtain any other order as well (StandardBank of SA Ltd v Trust Bank of
Africa Ltd 1968 (1) SA 102 (T) at 105-6).
(b) To regard an act as void has the effect of encouraging a court to
strike it down for want of jurisdiction: for ultimately the question
whether an act is void or voidable boils down to the view one takes of
jurisdiction. (See M Akehurst 'Void or Voidable?-Natural Justice and
Unnatural Meanings' (1968) 31 Modern LR 2, 138. Cf the approach of
Ogilvie Thompson CJ in Winter 1973 (1) SA 873 (A) at 891B and
Innes CJ in Union Government v Fakir 1923 AD 466 at 469-70, and
Narainsamy v Principal Immigration Officer 1923 AD 673 at 675.) There
is no space here to go into the question of jurisdiction. However,
though it is plain that our courts take a much narrower view ofjurisdiction than do the English courts (compare Muller JA in Theron
1976 (2) SA 1 (A) at 35B-D and Taitz op cit 1978 ActaJuridica 109 at
116-19 with Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969]
2 AC 147 and-more drastically-Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of
Harrow School [19791 QB 56; Lord Denning The Discipline of Law 74ff),
I have tried to show that it is inconsistent to contend that while a body
or official has no power (jurisdiction) to act 'substantively ultra vires',
it does have power (jurisdiction) to disregard the common law (viz the
requirements of natural justice) unless the affected party objects.
(c) One may well ask: since any 'void' act may have to be declared
to be so by the courts, why are they not all voidable? Rubinstein
(Jurisdiction and Illegality passim) distinguishes between void and
voidable acts on this very basis: viz that acts which require to be set
aside are only voidable, whereas a 'void' act can only be one which is
utterly void and which requires no setting aside at all. But to those
whose ideological bent is in favour of strict legality on the part of the
administration, this approach carries with it the danger of affording the
court an additional opportunity to validate an act which, even though
not in conformance with the strict principles of legality, the court feels
should stand, perhaps because the court suspects that the organ concerned would have reached the same decision anyway. (See Wade
op cit (1968) 84 LQR 95 at 110-15.)
Conclusion
(a) There is a general principle in our law that a defect of natural
justice cannot be cured by a domestic or administrative appeal. What is
required is a hearing de novo. Although such a general principle has been
doubted by the Privy Council in Calvin's case, there is no reason to
assume that the principle is in any doubt in South Africa.
(b) However, a hearing de novo should not be accepted as a substitution for the right to appeal from a decision. This important point
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made by MegarryJ in Leary appears to have been fully accepted by our
Appellate Division in Turner.
(c) Although our case law and commentators clearly indicate that, as
a general principle, a complainant should exhaust his domestic and
administrative remedies before seeking relief in the courts, I have
suggested that where there has been a defect of natural justice this
principle is undesirable for at least two pragmatic reasons: first, it
expects a complainant to be satisfied with an unjust bearing and a fair
appeal; and, secondly, the taint of the unjust hearing is inevitably
carried forward to the appeal.
(d) Furthermore, there is the interesting logical problem concerning
the status of the act or decision that is defective by reason of failure to
observe the principles of natural justice. The position in our law appears
to be that such a decision is voidable, not void. However, I have
suggested that this would be anomalous and that there is no difficulty
with the proposition that failure to observe natural justice constitutes a
void act. In doing so, I have made special reference to the recent
developments in England, but am acutely aware that this issue requires
much fuller consideration than space here provides.
L G BAXTER

SEX, NUDITY AND THE AVERAGE MAN

In order to piece together a portrait of the average man it is necessary
to look briefly at the concepts underlying his creation.
Section 47(2)(a) of the Publications Act 42 of 1974 provides that a
publication or object will be found to be undesirable if it, or any part
of it, is indecent or obscene or is offensive or harmful to public morals.
These concepts have been elucidated by the Publications Appeal Board
in the following manner:
(a) Indecent or obscene: a publication is 'indecent or obscene' if it
amounts to a disrespectful or morbid treatment of sex or nudity or
has the tendency to evoke lust or if it tends to arouse sexual passion
in connection with scenes of violence, cruelty or brutality (Brandwagpers (6/75) 4-5). Lust is understood to mean more than mere sexual
stimulation which forms part of everyday life (Drum (49/75) 2). It is
interpreted in Lords of the Flatbush (8/75) 4 to be exaggerated sexual
stimulation, in other words, passion.
(b) Offensive to public morals: 'offensive' is used by the Publications
Appeal Board as it was interpreted by Rumpff CJ in Publications Control
Board v Gallo (Africa) Ltd 1975 (3) SA 665 (A) at 673, as 'not intended to
mean merely something that displeases, but . . . intended to mean
something that is repugnant, that mortifies or pains' (Brandwagpers
(6/75) 6).
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